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NOTES

Harper & Row, Publishers v.

Nation Enterprises-Rewriting the
Fair use Criteria?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution gives authors and inventors a certain limited
degree of control over the products of their efforts in order that they
may secure and protect their proprietary interests.' Congress' most
recent exercise of the mandate to protect authors' works resulted in
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 [hereinafter referred to as the
Act].' The Act bestows upon the copyright owner certain exclusive
rights, among them the right to reproduce the copyrighted work and
3
the right to prepare materials derived from the copyrighted work.
The Act also incorporates what had been known previously only
in the common law as the fair use doctrine." Fair use has been called
1. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8; "The Congress shall have Power To ...promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries...
2. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101-810 (1983).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1983) states:
Subject to sections 107 . .. the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choroegraphic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1983) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
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"a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." 5
Fair use examples may involve the making of multiple copies of
passages from medical or other scientific texts for teaching and research
purposes,' the use of quotations in a work of criticism or parody"
or the use of similar plot lines in works of historical speculation.8
The Act presents four specific factors as meriting particular
attention in the fair use analysis. They are "1) the purpose and
character of the use ... 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole, and 4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 9
The Supreme Court recently discussed in detail its interpretation
of fair use in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.'0
In Harper & Row, the Court found The Nation's unauthorized use
of quotations from former President Ford's soon-to-be-released

copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a' fair use the factors to be considered shall include(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of -the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.

5. H. Ball,

LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY

260 (1944) (cited

in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973)
(permitting extensive photocopying of medical and scientific texts to facilitate ad,vancement of medicine).
7. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (the use of plot line similar to that of plaintiff's film
by defendant in burlesque sketch in television program was not an infringement of
plaintiff's copyright). "Since a burlesquer must make a sufficient use of the original
to ... conjure up the subject matter being burlesqued, the law permits more exten-,
sive use

..

. than in... works not intended as a burlesque of the original." Id. at 354.

8. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.
1980i (defendant, in writing fictionalized account of the Hindenburg disaster, was
permitted to make use of scenarios found in plaintiff's work).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See supra note 4.
10. 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
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autobiography not to be a fair use." In doing so, the Court placed
particular emphasis upon the stage of publication of the manuscript
and upon the manner and method of The Nation's use.' 2 This note
will examine the questionable validity and profound negative effects
of the Court's interpretation of the fair use doctrine upon the copyright
scheme.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND OF FAIR USE

THE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SCHEME

Although the American system of copyright protection has its
roots in the English system of regulating printing,' 3 protection of intellectual property in this country acquires its force of law from the
Constitution." The scope of protection given by Congress has steadily
increased since the first enactment in 1790, which regulated the production and distribution of books, maps and charts.' The statute
presently in effect covers a broad range of subject matter from writings
to sound recordings," and the list of exclusive rights granted to the
11. Id. at 2235.
12. Id. at 2227-28 & 2231-32.
13. Some of the earliest recognition of an author's proprietary interest in his
product was provided by the decrees of the Star Chamber in England in the late
1500's and was later codified in the first Copyright Act of 1709. Holmes v. Hurst,
174 U.S. 82, 85 (1899). For some early English authority dealing with authors' and
publishers' proprietary interests, see, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769)
and Donaldsons v. Becket, I Eng. Rep. 837 (1774) (cited in Holmes, 174 U.S. at 85).
14. See supra note 1.
15. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed by various acts) (first
broad federal copyright statute, providing protection for makers of maps, charts and
books); other major copyright enactments include the Act of April 29, 1802, ch.
36, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed February 3, 1831) (extending protection to etched and engraved prints); Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (amending several acts
respecting copyrights); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed March
4, 1909) (amending and absorbing Act of February 3, 1831, as well as other minor
enactments, into a unified intellectual property provision encompassing patent,
trademark, and copyright law; said copyright provisions now include musical and
dramatic compositions, photographs, statuary and models); Act- of March 4, 1909,
ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed July 30, 1947); Act of July
30, 1947, ch. 361, Pub. L. No., 80-281, 61 Stat. 652 (revised by the Copyright Act
of 1976, October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553). The Act of July 30, 1947, while
officially repealing the Act of March 4, 1909, retained largely unchanged its provisions concerning exclusive rights in copyright, adding motion pictures to the list of
protected subject matter, and codifying the copyright provisions as title 17 of the
United States Code.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) provides, in part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
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copyright owner is equally broad.' 7 A violation by a third party of
any of the exclusive rights held by the copyright owner is an infringement, entitling the copyright owner to sue the alleged infringer.' 8
The remedies provided by the Act included injunctions against the
infringer," impoundment of the infringing articles, 0 and monetary
damages."
B.

THE ELEMENTS OF A CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT

In order for a copyright owner to establish a prima facie case
of infringement, according to the prevailing view of the courts prior

to Harper & Row, the copyright owner must show that he is the true

owner of the copyright, and that the defendant copied the plaintiff's
work." Ownership is proved in part by a showing that the work in
question was originated by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff complied with the statutory formalities necessary for securing copyright
protection.2" Copying by the defendant can be shown either through
admission of copying by the defendant, or by demonstrating the
similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's works and by
proving that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work." The
standard used to measure the similarities between the two works has
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17. See supra note 3.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 a, b (1982).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 502.
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 503.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 504. The copyright owner may elect to take either actual
damages plus award of the infringer's profits, or statutory damages. Id.
22. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 at 13-3 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as NIMMER]. See, e.g., Towle Manufacturing Co. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.,
Ltd., 612 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (in dispute over bottle design, the
plaintiff's design had not been copyrighted, so the plaintiff could not prevail on
the issue of infringement).
23. NIMMER at § 13.01[A]. The formalities for securing protection are set forth
in 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (1982).
24. Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1937). If
a defendant has no access to the plaintiff's work, there could be similarity, but no
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been termed the "ordinary observer" test: would an average lay
observer perceive one of the works as having been taken from the
other? If so, then the similarity is sufficient to sustain a claim of
infringement, provided that access and originality with the plaintiff
are proved.2 5 A showing of intention to invade the copyright owner's
interests is not a necessary element of the plaintiff's claim. 6
C.

THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE

This section is intended only to lay out in broad terms the state

of the fair use doctrine prior to Harper & Row. While the various
copyright statutes enacted by Congress" followed the mandate of the
8
Constitution "to grant exclusive rights" to authors in their works,
courts recognized that to give an author an absolute monopoly over
his work would be undesirable, and that certain circumstances merited

a limited amount of unauthorized copying. " Despite language by courts
past and present describing fair use as a privilege preventing a finding
of infringement, 0 it has not been and is not a part of the plaintiff's
case to plead absence of fair use. Rather, fair use is an affirmative
defense for the defendant. 3 '

copying. Access could range from perusal of a written manuscript to reconstruction
of a hummed tune from memory. Id. at 418.
25. See, e.g., Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (dissection
of plots of two plays necessary to ascertain underlying similarity; likeness was insufficient to support infringement claim). But see Comptone Co., Ltd. v. Rayex Corp.
251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958) (copying need not be verbatim and paraphrasing
will not suffice to prevent finding of infringement).
26. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
The absence of an intent to infringe the plaintiff's copyright would not negate a
finding of infringement. MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862, 867 (D. Mass. 1914)
(defendant's uncontrolled copying from plaintiff's economics manual, while strictly
for teaching purposes and not for commercial exploitation, nevertheless warranted
an injunction against further copying due to the potential for damage to the plaintiff).
27. See supra note 15.
28. See supra note 1.

29. Among the first unauthorized uses of a plaintiff's work to be permitted
by the courts were inclusions in abridgements, dictionaries, and encyclopedias. Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (the use in defendant's biographical work of plaintiff's copyrighted letters would have been tolerable
had the amount used not been so excessive).
30. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F.6, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (defendant
privileged to use information found in plaintiff's physiology text to aid in preparing
her own); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d

Cir. 1966) (quoting from H. Ball, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). See

note 5.
31. See, e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 621, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(early case in which plaintiff benefitted from an unrebutted inference of access and
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An early case which suggested factors which might permit a use
in the situation of clear and certain copying, was Folsom v. Marsh. 2
Justice Story's opinion gave the following as worthwhile considerations:
The nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects
of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly
presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have exercised the same common dilligence [sic] in the
selection and arrangement of the materials."
These suggested factors were developed and refined by the courts
into four factors so relied upon in determining fair use that Congress
chose to specifically enumerate them in the codification of fair use
in 17 U.S.C. § 107.11
1.

The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in
Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
A fair use defense can be negated by a showing of a less-thantotal copying of the plaintiff's work." Conversely, use of a considerable
was required only to demonstrate the similarity between his and the defendant's works
to sustain infringement claim). Both the Senate and House Reports accompanying
the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 107 reflect an understanding of the status of fair use
as a defense. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. at 61 (1975), reprinted in
13 G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REvISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(1977)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 65 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in NIMMER at App. 4-26. An
explanation of some of the confusion as to the status of fair use as a privilege
or
defense may be taken from the classifications of varieties of fair use made by Professor Nimmer. Because the chief concern in a claim of infringement was the similarity
between works, de minimis copying which did not render the works "substantially
similar" was considered a fair use. A successful claim therefore had to show that
the amount copied was greater than a "fair use" amount and so made the works
substantially similar. The more common references to fair use involved cases where
no doubt existed as to copying or access, but overriding reasons for permitting the
use were present. NIMMER at 13-65.
32. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
33. Id. at 344. To use Justice Story's example, if a reviewer's object is to deliver
a "fair and reasonable" critique of another he might "fairly cite largely from the
original work." Id. The final factor discussing common information sources and
common work products merely reiterates the concept that two individuals might independently achieve substantially similar results and not infringe each other. See Story
v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 175 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 8135) (there must be
copying or colorable alteration; if resemblance arises solely from the defendant's
diligent work and research, no infringement).
34. SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 62; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 31, at 65.
35. See, e.g., Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (total or major appropriation of the
plaintiff's material was not necessary to support a finding of unfair use); Lawrence
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portion of the copyrighted work might be permitted.3 6 The greater
the amount taken, the less vital to the copyrighted work the material
taken has to be in order not to be a fair use. 37
2.

The Purpose and Character of the Use

Justice Story's suggestion, in Folsom v. Marsh, that authors of
critiques, abridgements, encyclopedias and the like might more readily
borrow from copyrighted works3" foreshadowed the current state of
the fair use doctrine. Certain uses, like news reporting, criticism or

commentary, or educational, scientific or artistic uses, are more likely

to result in a fair use finding, while other uses, like a competitive
commercial use, weigh against such a finding. 3
3.

The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

In some situations an examination of the protected matter, apart
from the alleged infringing work, will reveal reasons why use by the
defendant should be permitted. Some works, like formbooks, by viture
of their format suggest or even invite use or reproduction."' Another
consideration in this category is whether the copyrighted work is factual
or fictional, the latter being less subject to fair use."
v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136) (a copying of a small
amount of a protected work might rise to the level of infringement if the value of
that portion used was substantial).
36. See supra note 32.
37. The notion that the relation between the length of the defendant's work
and the amount and importance of the portion of copyrighted material used was
not widely employed by the courts and has been discarded except to negate a fair
use defense; if the bulk of the defendant's work is original material rather than just
a small fraction, the infringement still exists. See Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035,
1038-39 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (dicta stating that a defendant's infringing
use of the plaintiff's work might make up only a small portion of the defendant's
work, having "select[ed] . ..all the important passages[, and put them] in a comparatively moderate space. .. .
38. See supra note 29.
39. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973)
(copying allowed to serve advancement of medicine); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.,
220 F. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (commentary purpose recognized).
40. American Institute of Architecture v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (construction contractor's copying of architectural form considered
reasonable).
41. This follows from the fundamental concept that facts are not copyrightable.
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1889). See also Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404,
408-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (playwright did not have copyright in plot, but only in the
arrangement of the words); Kaeser & Blair v. Merchant's Ass'n, 64 F.2d 575, 577
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4.

The Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market for or
Value of the Copyrighted Work

Justice Story, in Folsom v. Marsh, did not list a version of this
factor with those mentioned previously," although competitive effect
did figure in the analysis of that case. The competitive effect of the
alleged infringing work upon the protected work has since become

an accepted factor in the analysis and is examined by courts in the
following manner: does the similarity between the works extend so
far as to render one a substitute for the other, in the same usage?
If so, then the competitive effect will weigh against a fair use finding."3
However, a total substitution has not been necessary to defeat fair
use.

4

The factors listed above do not constitute definite boundaries,
however. From the doctrine's inception, courts have agreed that a
(6th Cir. 1933) (while idea for method of selling goods was not copyrightable, the
original symbols or designs employed in the method were copyrightable); Long v.
Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (idea for system for old age pensioning plan was not copyrightable); Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185, 189
(l1th Cir. 1954) (plot lines for stories set in early days of the railroads were not
copyrightable and therefore not infringed by defendant's motion picture); Eisenschiml
v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957); Universal Athletic Sales Co.
v. Salkeld, 340 F. Supp. 899, 901 (W.D. Penn. 1972) (preliminary injunction granted
on showing by plaintiff that defendant had copied nearly exactly plaintiff's diagrams
for exercise equipment instruction chart). Authors of works containing factual or
historical material must rely more heavily upon the original expression or arrangement of that material to obtain and maintain a copyright in that work than must
authors of fictional works. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d
972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. See supra text accompanying note 33.
43. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. at 345, 348. Because of the particular
significance of the letters used by the defendant, in comparison with the remainder
of the letters found in the plaintiff's work, the alleged infringing work was found
to be a substitute, in the eye of the consuming public, for the plaintiff's book and
was therefore found to be an infringement. Id. at 348.
44. See Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325, 327 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1884) (dicta stating
that injunctive relief may be granted against defendant, even though the defendant's
work did not act as a substitute for the plaintiff's work, when infringement was
otherwise proven); Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co.,
146 F. 332, 335 (C.C.D. Conn. 1906) (although the defendant's directory was for
a different year than that of the plaintiff's and therefore could not have competed
with the plaintiff's earlier directory, the plaintiff had been injured due to the defendant's copying). Even a potential damaging effect may be sufficient to merit some
relief. Cf. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165,
183-84 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 356

U.S. 43 (1958) (the trial court holding that an unfair use may be found in the complete absence of a competing use or other injurious effect upon the plaintiff's work).
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rigid, mechanical application of the primary factors is not the proper

method of analyzing the fair use issue." In addition to the primary

factors, courts have employed other factors which, while not falling
strictly within the traditional fair use analysis, have often influenced
a court when an analysis employing only the primary factors would
be inconclusive. Two such considerations, which arose in Harper &
Row, are the general public interest factor and the bad faith factor.
5.

The Public Interest Factor

The general public interest factor is different from the sort of
interest involved in the "nature of the protected work" and "purpose and character of the use" factors."' In measuring those factors,
the protected material and the copying work were looked at in light
of some existing or continuing well-defined public need to be filled
or public benefit to be achieved.' 7 In weighing the public interest factor, the concern is whether the copyrighted material is of such importance to the public at large that the need for its availability to
the public outweighs the copyright owner's right to control its
dissemination,"' independent of any existing need or benefit immediately accruing to the public.' 9 Unlike the primary factors, the develop45. See, e.g., Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444, 450

(D.D.C. 1967) (the fair use analysis is one which is to be applied on a case-by-case
basis, taking into consideration all of the facts in evidence in a given case).
46. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
47. E.g.,* Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (1973)
(the court recognized that the allowance of photocopying of medical and other scientific texts was of key importance to the continued advancement of medical science
and scholarship).
48. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307
(2d Cir. 1966) ("Whether the privilege [of fair use] may justifiably be applied to
particular [copyrighted] material turns [on] whether their distribution would serve
the public interest in the free dissemination of information"); Meeropol v. Nizer,
361 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (continued interest in the trial and execution of alleged spies invited entry of new views into the public debate concerning
the case; application of'the fair use doctrine would be appropriate).
49. There is a great possibility of confusion concerning the public interest factor,
and the courts have been less than artful in defining this interest so as to distinguish
it from the purpose of the use and nature of the copyrighted work factors. It may
be helpful to think of the problem in the following manner: through the development of sufficient interest and need in certain specific fields of scholarship or endeavor
(like news reporting, teaching, scientific research), certain particular uses of a protected material have come to be regarded as favored uses, and their presence as such
in a given fact pattern supports a fair use finding. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities,
Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977). This analysis
of the favored use need not examine the protected material any more closely than
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ment of the public interest factor was limited prior to the passage
of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.
6.

The Bad Faith Factor

It has been presumed that one who would use another's work
without authorization would do so in a reasonable manner.50 While

not an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case, a pleading of bad
faith on the defendant's part will greatly assist a plaintiff in negating

a fair use defense by showing the unreasonable manner of the use.
One example of bad faith would be a demonstration of an intent

to infringe. A knowing and willful use of copyrighted material would
weigh heavily against the defendant. The opposite proposition, that
an honest intention might prevent a finding of infringement, has not
generally been applied. 5
Aside from the consideration of the presence of an intent to in-

fringe (i.e., willfully violate a copyright), bad faith also encompasses
the defendant's conduct in copying; for example, copying and

paraphrasing merely for the sake of saving time, labor and expense
would prevent a fair use finding. 2 Recent decisions have indicated

is necessary to determine if the material would serve the favored use once such use
has been found to exist in the given case. The public interest factor involves an
examination of the protected material itself, to see if it is of such importance as
to require ready accessibility. If such were the case, then the public interest factor
would strongly suggest a finding of fair use even in the case of a disfavored use.
See Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Maintaining Equilbrium, 43 LA. L.
REv. 735, 754 (1983). ("This factor actually reflects the underlying basis for any
fair use decision-an attempt to balance the copyright owner's right to compensation against society's interest in immediate, as well as long term, advancement of
knowledge.") The question to be answered, or at least discussed, is whether this
factor outweighs all other factors. See infra text, pp. 31-34, and accompanying
footnotes.
50. See, e.g., Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
51. Id. at 345 & 349 (although the defendant did not intend to infringe the
plaintiff's biographical work by using several hundred copyrighted letters written by
historical figure, infringement was still found); see also Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325,
327 (C.C.W.D. Penn. 1884) (honest intent of the defendant was immaterial, should
independent grounds exist for a finding of infringement). For cases discussing the
possible applicability of good intent, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26,
60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136) (dicta stating that where the defendant had published allegedly unauthorized editions of legal tome for which the plaintiff had written and copyrighted notes, the defendant's innocent intent, while of no avail in a
court of law, if a separate grounds for infringement claim were shown, might lead
to some form of relief in a court of equity).
52. Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 761 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) (the
defendants, in producing a volume of rules of the New York Supreme Court, had
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that a defendant's misconduct in acquiring the allegedly infringed
material would be similarly treated by a court."
III.

THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF HARPER & Row v. NATION

Shortly after leaving office, President Gerald Ford, on February
28, 1977, signed an agreement with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
and the Reader's Digest Association (hereinafter referred to collectively as Harper & Row), granting to them the exclusive rights to
publish his memoirs." As part of the agreement, Ford was to avoid
releasing to the media any information previously undisclosed to the
public." The memoirs were to concern themselves with Ford's career
generally; reminiscences from his childhood, family life and congressional career and his experiences following his term as President, as
well as his impressions of the events during the Watergate era were
to be included.56 The-manuscript was prepared with the aid of a professional writer, who conducted taped interviews with Ford, and with
other public figures involved in the events of Ford's presidency." A
first draft was ready by February, 1979.58 Harper & Row entered into an agreement with Time, Inc., in March of 1979, giving Time,
Inc. exclusive rights to publish excerpts from the manuscript. The
publication of the excerpts was expected shortly before the full
copied notes from plaintiff's similar work merely for expediency's sake and were
thus liable for infringement).
53. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (the defendant, against the expressed intent of the plaintiffs, had
made copies of plaintiff's film of the John F. Kennedy assassination which were
later used in the defendant's book; the court expressed an "initial reluctance to find
any fair use" because of the defendant's conduct; however, a fair use was found
because an authorized access to the film was later given and the defendant also offered
to pay royalties for the use of the film); Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305
F. Supp. 339, 350 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (defendant's booklet on guitar chording copied
identically plaintiff's system of categorizing and presenting chords in plaintiff's chord
instruction device; in dicta, the court stated that "the manner in which the defen-

dant had gone about the business of copying, i.e., whether this copyiiig was deliberate,

in defiance of the copyright owner, or through subterfuge," should be considered
in determining fair use).

54. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 197 (2d
Cir. 1983).
55. Id.. at 197-98. Although spontaneous brief comments by Ford were not
to be considered a breach of the agreement, President Ford did later refuse to par-.
ticipate in a network television interview, the topic of which was Ford's pardon of
President Nixon, possibly in consideration of the confidentiality agreement. Id. at 198.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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manuscript's release." The agreement provided for Time, Inc. to pay
Harper & Row $12,500 in advance, and an additional $12,500 upon
publication of the licensed excerpts; the second sum being negotiable
by Time, Inc. in the event that any publication of the licensed portions occurred prior to Time's release."
Shortly after Harper & Row entered into the agreement with Time,
Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a political and news commentary magazine, received a copy of the Ford manuscript from an unidentified person."
Once in possession of the manuscript, Navasky, with a certain
degree of haste,6" composed an article of some 2,250 words which
used roughly 300 words of direct quotation from the manuscript. The
bulk of the article used language which tracked certain passages from
the licensed excerpts with substantial similarity.6" The Nation article,
which dealt primarily with Ford's involvement in the Nixon pardon,
appeared on the news-stands April 3, 1979, two weeks prior to the
scheduled release of the Time article.6 ' Unable to secure permission
to advance the publication date, Time, Inc. instead chose not to publish
and subsequently refused to pay the $12,500 remaining on its con65
tract with Harper & Row.
Harper & Row, as plaintiffs, filed suit in the District Court of
New York, against the Nation Enterprises and The Nation Associates,
Inc. as defendants.6 6 Harper & Row sought as damages the $12,500
lost when Time, Inc. withdrew from the licensing agreement. 67
The district court found that the protected matter from the Ford
memoir, A Time to Heal, had been copied to sdch an extent that,
unless excused by fair use, the defendants would be liable for
59. Id.
60. Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners].
61. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 22 (1985). It was not disputed that the
delivery of the manuscript was unsolicited and unauthorized. Brief for Petitioners
at 8. Brief for Respondents at 9, Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985) [hereinafter

cited as Brief for Respondents].

62. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2222.

63. Brief for Petitioners at 9. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation

Enter., 557 F. Supp. at 1069.

64. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d at 198.

65. Id. at 199. Not discussed at any stage of the case, Harper & Row's refusal
to advance the release date of the excerpts might have been considered a failure
to mitigate damages. No reason given for the refusal is found in the cases; possibly

a carefully orchestrated marketing plan for the book would have been disrupted,
66. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1067.
67. Id. at 1072.
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infringement.6 8 The court, adhering closely to the guidelines of 17

U.S.C. § 107,69 focused its inquiry initially on whether The Nation's
use constituted news reporting."' After determining that the bulk of
the material used was information previously disclosed to the public,"
the court determined that the newsworthiness of the material in the
article was insufficient to warrant its unauthorized use."' The court
then disposed of the fair use analysis by determining that the commercial usage by The Nation, the prepublication status of the
manuscript, the value of the material taken, and the existence of the
canceled contract with Time, Inc. combined to negate the fair use
defense." 3
The district court also rejected the defendants' argument that since
the bulk of the materials copied were in fact uncopyrightable, being
constructed from historical facts and memoranda prepared by persons
other than Ford," the amount of the taking was justifiable." The
argument was rejected on the ground that the "totality" of per se
uncopyrightable historical facts and ideas and Ford's expressions of
those facts and ideas was what was protected and was what The Nation

had willfully copied.

6

Upon appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."
The court first determined that the only protected material in the article
68. Id. at 1073.
69. See supra note 4.
70. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1070. District Judge Owen's opinion
approached the fair use issue as if the purpose of the use factor carried greater weight
in the analysis than the other enumerated factors. Id. While the opinion gives no
rationale for this approach, §107 mentions in its preamble certain specific uses. Judge
Owen may have interpreted the statute as requiring a finding that the use fit within
one of those suggested in the statute before proceeding with the analysis.
71. Id. at 1070-72. According to Navasky, the newsworthiness lay primarily
in the content of a conversation between Ford and Chief and Staff Alexander Haig
concerning Nixon's possible resignation. The conversation had been the topic of a
congressional committee hearing in 1974, was widely covered by the press, and was
therefore found by the court not to be news. Id. at 1071.
72. Id. at 1072.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The copyrightable material, in The Nation's view, was the directly quoted
material. Brief for Respondents at 38.
76. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072-73.
77. Harper & Row, 723 F. 2d 195. The Court of Appeals began its opinion
by reviewing and disposing of several state law claims which Harper & Row had
presented to the District Court. Harper & Row had also claimed conversion and
tortious interference with contractual relations. Id. at 199-201. These claims were
dismissed upon motion by the lower court. Id. at 199. The Court of Appeals also
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consisted of the 300 or so words of direct quotation." The Court
of Appeals also repudiated the lower court's characterization of The

Nation article as not sufficiently newsworthy," and found that the

lower court had misapplied each of the statutory factors.

0

The opinion

emphasized the fact that the general public interest in the events
discussed in the Ford memoirs helped to defeat the copyright owners'

interests.'

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

THE REPORT

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court." The Court

began its analysis by first discussing the fundamental nature and purpose of the copyright protections provided by the Constitution and

Congress, stating that the Second Circuit lacked the appropriate con-

fidence in the statute's ability to both assure dissemination of ideas
and reward authors for their original efforts.8 " The Court further stated
that the copyright owners of A Time to Heal had fully complied with

the required notice and registration procedures, and were therefore
entitled to protection of the manuscript in its entirety.8 '
The Court declined to address the issue of the mixture of

found the state law claims to be without merit. The unauthorized publication aspect
of the conversion claim was found to be pre-empted by 17 U.S.C. § 301. Id. at
201. The conversion by possession claim was dismissed because of the court's finding
that the taking for a short period of a copy of a manuscript, which was returned
undamaged, was "far too insubstantial an interference with property rights to
demonstrate conversion." Id. The claim of tortious interference with contractual relations was also found to be pre-empted by the federal copyright law in that the right
to enjoy. exploitation of copyrighted material in the production of derivative works
was a right covered by 17 U.S.C. § 106. See supra note 3.
78. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 206. The Court of Appeals discounted the
District Court's "totality" analysis, finding that the "state of mind" of a public
official (i.e., his impressions) concerning significant affairs of state were as much
a fact as any act by that official. Id. at 204-09. Other portions of the text were
found to be uncopyrightable since they had been previously printed in government
documents or having been merely Ford's recounting of the words of other persons'
conversations. Id.
79. Id. at 206-07. The court expressed the view that the degree of newsworthiness
of the article's subject matter should not bear upon the issue of deciding whether
or not the article's purpose was to report the news. Id. at 206.
80. Id. at 208.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 208-09.
Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. 2218.
Id. at 2223.
Id. at 2224.
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copyrightable and allegedly uncopyrightable materials in the plaintiffs'
manuscript, as had the Court of Appeals, and instead proceeded on
the basis of the undisputed direct quotations, stating that the arguments
against fair use applied even in the context of the direct quotations
alone. 5
The Court began its analysis of whether The Nation's use of direct
quotation was a fair use by characterizing the Act's fair use provisions as no more than Congress' adoption of the common law. 6 The
Court interpreted the common law as emphasizing the subjective view
of the copyright owner with regard to the propriety of the use in
determining the level of fairness. In other words, could the copyright
owner's consent to the use be reasonably implied from the circumstances of the use?"
Noting that traditionally, the common law did not recognize the
fair use defense in cases in which the allegedly infringed work was
not yet published, 8 the Court then proceeded to analyze the validity
and appropriate impact of this doctrine in the present day. Observing
that the Act expressly reserves for the copyright owner the right to
first publication of his work, 9 the Court rejected The Nation's argument that the common law tendency to protect unpublished works
was eliminated by the statute, and held that prepublication status of
a work weighed against a finding of fair use. 90
Also rejected was The Nation's argument that the copyright owner
had shown no valid interest in keeping the manuscript from the
public.' The Court found that the statutory first publication right
permitted an author to plan and prepare the dissemination of his protected matter free from fear of an unauthorized premature publication.9"
85. ID. at 2225.
86. Id., quoting from H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 65,
reprinted in NIMMER at App. 4-26.
87. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2225.
88. Id. at 2226. The Court cited American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207
U.S. 204 (1907), as stating the common law rule that there was no possible fair
use in copying from an unpublished work.
89. 105 S. Ct. at 2227.
90. Id., citing to S. RP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 64 (1975),
reprinted in 13 G. GROSSMAN, OMIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(1977). By establishing the validity of the Court's preference against prepublication
fair use, the Court was then free to apply that preference as a factor in and of
itself and as a component of the nature of the copyrighted work factor. Harper
& Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2226.
91. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2228.
92. Id.
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Next addressed was The Nation's first amendment public interest
argument that the use of quotes was excused and in fact necessary
to the reporting of the news story. 93 Recognizing the conflict between
copyright interests and news reporting interests, the Court emphasized
the need to distinguish between facts and ideas, which are not protected, and an author's expressions, which are. 9' The Court further
stated that material having significant social value did not necessarily
5
lend itself to fair use more readily than other subject matter. It would
be "fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord
lesser rights in those works that are of the greatest importance to
the public." 96 The rationale presented for this position was the proposition that authors of works of great social value would be deterred from disseminating their works and generally deprived of their
incentive to produce.9" The Court further expressed its view that the
first amendment freedoms give an individual, like President Ford, the
right to choose when he will speak; 98 this right devolved to Harper
& Row as owners of the copyright. The majority applied the four
factors specified in the statute, 99 the Court recognizing Congress' identification of them as "especially relevant.""'
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
While the Court acknowledged the propriety of the Second Circuit's determination of the use as news reporting and that the quality
of the news content was immaterial to the issue, it rejected that finding
93. This argument was hinted at in the closing paragraphs of the Court of
Appeals' opinion finding fair use. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208-09. The Second
Circuit expressed the view that for the purpose of reporting an event of such great
political and social significance the use of a certain amount of direct quotes should
be permitted. Id.
94. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2228. See supra note 13.
95. Id. at 2230.
96. Id. The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, also employed a first amendment argument that the freedom of expression and information rights militate in
favor of fair use where the protected material was only paraphrased. Id. at 2242-44.
Justice Brennan firmly held to the view that despite statements to the contrary, the
majority did in fact base its finding of no fair use upon the "totality" analysis set
up by the District Court. Id. Those portions which were copied verbatim were to
be excused because of the news reporting purpose. See infra note 106.
97. 105 S. Ct. at 2230. Whether this proposition would turn out to be correct
in practice remains an unanswered question.
98. Id.

99. See supra note 4.

100. Harper & Row, 105 S.Ct. at 2231. The Court did not elaborate on why
the statutory factors were especially relevant.
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by referring to The Nation's profit-seeking motive as well as its ex-

pressed desire to make a "news event" out of the fact that it obtained a'copy of the manuscript.' 0' The majority suggested that had The
Nation's motives been purer, i.e., free of the "scoop" mentality, less
dependent upon the quotations as the source of the article's strucpurpose might have been more supporture, then the news reporting
02
tive of a fair use finding.'
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The Court recognized the common lawtendency to find fair use

more readily in the instance of historical or biographical works. 0 3

However, the prepublication status of the work, combined with the
strong confidentiality interest demonstrated by both the terms of the
licensing agreement and the conduct of the parties to it, persuaded

the Court that it would have been unreasonable to imply that the
copyright owners would have consented to The Nation's use of the

manuscript.'

3.

0

Amount and Substantiality of the Use in Relation to the
Copyrighted Work as a Whole
The majority did not adopt the District Court's "totality" analysis,

which had relied upon both quotations and the paraphrased material
to find the amount taken excessive.1'1 It did adopt the District Court's
finding that the quotes were substantial in qualitative value compared

101. Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, emphasized the need for a
would-be fair user to adhere to a certain minimum level of reasonableness. No particular standard of conduct was specificied, however.
102. Id. Justice Brennan's dissent, while agreeing with the majority's characterization of The Nation's use as news reporting, expressed distress at the majority's reliance
upon the respondent's commercial expectations and journalistic ethics (or lack thereof),
stating that the majority's imputation of bad faith was unwarranted and should not
have been used against The Nation. Id. at 2247-48.
103. Id. at 2232.
104. Id. The dissent emphatically stated that the presumption against prepublication fair use that the majority would raise was not nearly so cut and dried a proposition as the majority suggested; the dissent preferred to decide the prepublication
issue only after the nature and usage of the copied work were analyzed. Id. at 2250.
In addition, the interest in confidentiality demonstrated by the agreement between
Harper & Row and President Ford was recategorized by the dissent as an economic
interest, to be considered not in ascertaining the nature of the work, but in determining the market effect of the use. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2250; see also
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
105. 105 S. Ct. at 2233. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

to the manuscript as a whole.' 0 6 The Court relied upon this evaluation to hold that this factor weighed against fair use.' 07 To support
this determination, the court examined the value placed upon the
material taken by The Nation's editor, who had selected the particular

portions because they were the most moving and effective passages

in those chapters on Nixon's pardon. 08
The only use made by the Court of the actual amount taken
was to compare it to The Nation article's length. The comparison
resulted in the finding that The Nation's reliance upon Ford's language
to provide the article's structure supported the conclusion that the
taking was substantial.' 0 '
4.

Effect on the Market

Taking the position that the actual or potential market effect of
a defendant's work was the most important factor in the fair use
analysis,' °, the Court readily found that Time, Inc.'s refusal to fulfill
the publication agreement with Harper & Row to be substantial and
conclusive evidence of damage."' Such a showing of damage
demonstrated that the value to Harper & Row of the copyrighted work

106. 105 S. Ct. at 2233. This evaluation, the dissent stated, was based not upon
the usage of quoted (undisputedly protected) material alone, but upon the totality
of quotes and paraphrased material referred to by the District Court. Id. at 2251,
citing Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072. The taking, therefore, was far less
substantial than the majority depicted, especially in light of the news reporting purpose.

,Harper& Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2251.

107. 105 S. Ct. at 2251, (citing Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
Broidcasting System, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (less than one
minute long excerpt taken from a one-and-one half hour film is a substantial taking)).
108. 105 S. Ct. at 2233.
109. Id. at 2234. The Court's measurement of the amount taken in comparison
with the size of the defendant's work is not commonly used in fair use analysis
and has not been used by recent courts. See supra note 37. The tone of the opinion
suggests that the Court found the manner of The Nation's use of the quotes as the
article's framework particularly offensive. Better use of that observation might have
been made in regard to the "purpose and character of the use" factor. Since bad
faith is now a component of the purpose factor, The Nation's use of the quotations
as the framework for the article might just as easily have been considered another bad
faith journalism tactic. See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
110. Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2234.
11l. Id. The opinion does not discuss the effect upon the causation issue of
Harper & Row's refusal to change the release date of the excerpts. The Court merely
observed that Harper & Row, by demonstrating that the cancelled agreement had
presented a prima facie case of infringement with damages, which The Nation, upon
whom the burden of persuasion rested, did not refute.
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had been adversely affected, such effect strongly working against a
fair use finding."'
In addition to the adverse actual effect on the value, the Court
found an effect upon the market for the copyrighted work itself.' 3
While the Nation article could not be considered to be in competition with the manuscript as a whole, it could be considered as being
in competition with legitimately licensed excerpts of the manuscript,
4
like the proposed Time article.'"
In summation, the Court found that the Second Circuit had erred
in its evaluation of the fair use doctrine and held that The Nation's
use of the verbatim quotations from A Time to Heal constituted an
infringement of the petitioner's copyright."'
B.

ANALYSIS

The precedential value of any copyright fair use determination
is inherently limited, by virtue of a common law tradition which requires a case-by-case analysis. ' 6 As the first detailed handling of
statutory fair use by the Court, however, Harper & Row does pro-

vide strong guidelines as to how the fair use issue will be treated in
the future. ' 7 Due to the case-by-case nature of the fair use analysis,
the -significance of the majority's holding lies, not in the Court's determination of how the fact pattern fit into the fair use scheme, but
in.the Court's interpretation of the factors constituting fair use." '

112. Id.
113. Id.at 2235.
114. Id. The dissent disputed the majority's finding of a causal relation between
The Nation article and the cancelled agreement on the ground that the use of uncopyrightable facts and not the use of the particular words, caused the cancellation.
Support for this position was taken from the existence of the confidentiality agreement between Ford and Harper & Row, which focused on restricting the premature
release of any previously undisclosed information. Id. at 2252-53. Both the majority
and dissenting opinions make subjective assumptions as to which aspect of the excerpts, the factual content or Ford's expression, was more important to Time, Inc.
The opinions fail to conclusively indicate which assumption is the closest to the truth.
115. Id.at 2234-35.
116. Id.at 2235.
117. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 65, reprinted in NIMMER
at App. 4-26. This fundamental approach has been a component of fair use analysis
in this country from its earliest beginnings. See e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
118. The Court did deal with fair use somewhat in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and held that since commercial and
non-commerciar video tapers of copyrighted television and other programs would
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1. Bad Faith and the Purpose Factor
While nowhere in the majority opinion in Harper & Row does

the Court use the term "bad faith," its presence in the analysis is
undeniably damaging to The Nation's fair use defense.' II The Court
called both The Nation's subjective intent and conduct into question,
stating them to be aspects of the purpose and character of the use."'
The commercial usage and the "scoop" attitude demonstrated by the

manner of the knowing unauthorized use were considered to have
tainted the valid news reporting purpose, the purpose factor thereby

acting to negate a fair use defense.' 2

Prior to Harper & Row, inquiry into the purpose of the use had
come to mean an objective look at whether the copying work fulfilled some specific socially useful function. Such uses as scientific
or medical advancement, historical or biographical exposition, or news
reporting or commentary (uses suggested in the preamble of 17 U.S.C.
only cause minimal damage to the value of the programs, such taping was therefore
no infringement. Id. at 4098.
119. Before diving into discussion of the purely fair use-related issues, there
is a preliminary matter which is of at least historical interest and should be addressed. In tackling the fair use problem as such, both majority and dissent bound
themselves to the point that if any portion of The Nation article was an infringement, it was the 300-plus words of direct quotations. A firm determination of use
of protected matter in the remainder of the article would have made the amount
and substantiality factor lean more heavily against fair use, and therefore require
the defendants to make a stronger showing with regard to the purpose, nature, and
market effect factors in order to make a successful fair use defense. See Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 420 U.S.
376 (1975) (wholesale photocopying of portions of copyrighted medical texts justifiable
largely because medical and scientific research would be crippled if copying were
prohibited). The hesitance of the Court to use the similarly phrased passages cannot
have been based upon a feeling that the position that the use of the passages amounted
to copying was untenable; traditionally, courts have been willing to give broad meaning
to the concepts of paraphrasing and use of organizational techniques as copying.
See, e.g., Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir.), cert.
den., 355 U.S. 107 (1957) ("copying is not necessarily a literal or exact repetition
or reproduction"); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 227
(E.D.N.Y. 1963) (citing and quoting with approval Nutt v. National Inst. Inc. for
the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (1929)). An appropriate inference
to make from this hesitance would be to assume that the Court wished to make
a statement concerning the amount factor in relation to the others; the statement
being the affirmation of the fundamental concept that so long as some copying is
firmly established, the copying may be minimal in amount if the other factors point
away from a fair use finding.
120. Harper & Row, 105 S.Ct. at 2232.
121. Id.
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§ 107) would support a finding of fair use.' 2 On the other hand,
if the use was purely for profit, a finding against fair use would be
suggested. 2I 3
The development of the bad faith consideration arose separately
from the four primary factors, largely because the alleged infringer's
intent originally was not a factor in the analysis.' 2 This situation was
to change, however. One court suggested that innocent intent on the
defendant's part might be looked upon favorably.' 2 5 The method
employed by the majority of the courts was to look at intent only
when a bad faith use or animo furandi, was present.'2 6 If a bad faith
use was found, then it would be included as a separate factor in
addition to the primary factors.' 7 Until Harper & Row, the approach
to the issue of intent appeared to have been 'settled in the manner
described; namely, good intent did not support a fair use defense,'",
bad intent did figure in the analysis as a separate factor possibly fatal
1 29
to a defendant's case.

The Court's use of intent and conduct in Harper & Row changes
the previously settled pattern,'3 0 by naming intent and conduct as com122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp. 214 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
124. See supra note 4. Infringement is a strict liability action. Therefore, the
defendant's subjective intent was not a necessary element in a prima facie case. Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).

125. See supra note 53.
126. The presumption that good faith is an integral part of an actual case of
fair use may be the basis for this approach. See, Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at
2232 (quoting with approval Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); "Fair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing'."). If
good faith is treated as a requirement for fair use, as opposed to being treated as
just a factor, then its presence would not affect the analysis. Conversely, its absence
should end the analysis.
127. See, e.g., Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 761 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No.
961) (use merely to save time and labor particularly demning to defendant's case).
128. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962). But see American Inst.
of Architecture v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (where state on
cover of plaintiff's form book created in defendant an "honest understanding" that
copying was not proscribed; this use of intent might also be attributed to an analysis
of the nature of the copyrighted work, in that formbooks, as a rule, are meant to
be used).
129. See supra note 53.
130. According to the dissent, The Nation's intent was never proved and should
not have even entered the analysis. 105 S. Ct. at 2248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
All The Nation could be accused of was an unauthorized use. Id. Justice Brennan
seems to suggest that bad faith is present only when the conduct and intent preceding
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"' No specific rationale
ponents of purpose and character of the use.13
was given for the inclusion; it was presented as an accepted fact.'
One possible reason may be found in the record of the passage of

the Act. Although Congress clearly did not intend to confine the fair
use analysis to the factors listed in the statute,'" it is just as clear
that those factors were meant to represent basic categories into which

nearly all fair use considerations would fall.' 34 By naming bad faith

as a purpose, the Court has attempted to consolidate and simplify
the application of that factor.
While the Court's placement of bad faith as a subfactor of the
purpose factor may have some support in traditional copyright law

principles, its characterization of The Nation's conduct and expressed
intent as bad faith is particularly questionable. Traditional bad faith
conduct analyses have generally focused upon the competitive manner in which the copyrighted material was acquired and used. For

the actual use rises to criminal or tortious levels. Id. The majority was not so concerned with the matter of how The Nation acquired the manuscript (although the
suspicion that it was stolen is clear), as it was with the manner of the use. The
propriety of this concern is discussed in the section to follow dealing with the possible first amendment issues. See text p. 27 and notes 140-142, infra.
131. One way to visualize the interaction of the various fair use considerations
is to imagine a pyramid of fair use factors. The top of the pyramid is the ultimate
question: fair use-yes or no? Some basic categories of considerations (primary factors) underlie this question. Each of these basic categories or primary factors is made
up of sub-factors, the balance of which determines whether a given factor favors
or disfavors fair use. What the Court has done in Harper & Row is to change the
positions, and therefore change the effect of some of the factors and subfactors.
For example, in the tier of primary factors lie the questions of amount and substantiality, and competitive effect, along with the nature of the copyrighted work and
purpose of the use. Traditionally, the bad faith factor was in this tier, when present
at all, serving to offset but not remove the other main factors in the analysis. The
Court has placed bad faith in the position of a sub-factor of the purpose and character
of the use primary factor. In this way, instead of only offsetting an objectively favored
use as before, bad faith can make the purpose factor weigh against fair use. (Case
law prior to Harper & Row had not clearly revealed instances where an objectively
measured purpose other than commercial exploitation would be disfavored; pornography might possibly be such a use.) The net effect of the change gives more
impact to the presence of bad faith.
This pyramidal analogy also applies to the stage of publication question. See
infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
132. The dissent also does not dispute the categorization of bad faith as a proper purpose inquiry, rejecting only its factual applicability in the the case. 105 S.
Ct. at 2247-48.
133. See supra note 4.

134. House REPORT at 65. It is reasonable to look upon "purpose" as including
both objective and subjective purposes, despite language in the statute suggesting
only objectively measured purposes, such as teaching or commercial exploitation.
17 U.S.C. § 107 preamble and (1). See supra note 4.
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example, copying to save time and labor, where the defendant's and
plaintiff's works compete for the same share of a given market, is
always found to be an unfair use.'"
Since The Nation did not solicit the manuscript and no criminal
allegations were proved against the magazine or Editor Navasky personally, the most that The Nation could be accused of is a knowingly unauthorized use and perhaps a studied ignorance of the manner
of its acquisition.' 36 Thus the Court was forced to rely upon the knowing unauthorized use, the basis of any infringement claim, and The
Nation's stated "scoop" objective.
Had it been conclusively proved that The Nation was aware of
the planned Time article, then the competetive aspect of the 'scoop"
mentality would more plainly support the Court's position. Knowledge
of the article on The Nation's part was disputed, however.'"" This
dispute was not acknowledged by the Court.
The impropriety of the Court's use of abstract ethical considerations lies not in its novelty, since use of such considerations has been
but in its use in the journalism conviewed favorably elsewhere,'
text. By derogating the "scoop" attitude, the Court subjected The
Nation's editorial process and Navasky's editorial judgment to a level
of scrutiny previously applied only in more drastic kinds of fact patterns involving, for example, purely commercial publications,' 39 or
journalistic libel cases. 14 0 In this light, the Court's use of bad faith
1
can be seen as an erosion of the protection of editorial freedom."
135. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co.,
79 F. 756, 772 (2d Cir. 1897) (defendant legal digest publisher's employees copied
case notes from competitor's digest); Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38, 39 (7th
Cir. 1967) (defendant copied from competitor's shipping and freight rate directory;
use allowable for checking purposes, but a compiler is expected to do his own work
in initially gathering information).
136. As observed in Justice Brennan's dissent. 105 S. Ct. at 2247-8.
137. Compare Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 198, with Harper & Row 557 F.

Supp. at 1069.
138.
139.
376, 386
question

See supra note .53.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
(1973). The editorial judgment of a newspaper staff was found subject to
when commercial, transaction-soliciting advertisement are involved. The

newspaper had placed sex-specific want ads in sex-designated columns in violation
of a local, ordinance. Id.'

140. No first amendment bar to discovery of editorial processes and editorial
frame of mind exists in libel cases, if the inquiry provides proof of a critical element
of the plaintiff's cause of action. Herbert v. Lando 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (plaintiff Vietnam veteran had been mentioned in defendant's news report in connection
with speculation on possible war crimes; plaintiff sued for libel.
.141. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); c.f., Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). (a Florida statute requiring newspapers
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2.

Stage of Publication as an Aspect of the Nature of the
Protected Work

A second salient feature of Harper & Row was the Court's in-

clusion of the stage of publication of the Ford manuscript into the
fair use analysis, both as an element of the nature of the copyrighted
work factor set out in the statute, and as a general consideration."'
Although the Court stated that in each of these capacities, stage of
publication was "a factor tending to negate the defense of fair use, "
the combined effect was to essentially raise a presumption against
fair use when the prepublication status is present.
The Court based its position on stage of publication upon the
traditional common law interest in protecting the copyright owner's
right of first publication.' 4 This protection was considered virtually

absolute,"" and extended to unpublished works fixed in a tangible

form." 64 Under the current statute, federal protection attaches from

the moment of creation in a fixed form, and pre-empts any common
law protection-of existing unpublished works.""

By creating this presumption, the Court appears to conflict directly
with a literal reading of the Act. Although a right of first publicato grant equal space to political candidates whose characters are attacked by the
newspaper was struck down as an intrusion into the realm of editorial judgment
protected by the first amendment).
142. 105 S. Ct. at 2228, 2232-3. Returning to the factor-pyramid analogy, see
supra note 129, stage of publication now occupies two positions in the pyramid.
The first position discussed is that of a general limiting factor, one to be considered
before examining the purpose, competitive effect, nature of the copyrighted work,
or amount and substantiality factors. The second position described is that of a subfactor of the nature of the protected work.
143., 105 S. Ct. at 2227-8, quoting with approval NIMMER, § 13.05, at 13-62.
144. 105 S. Ct. at 2226.
145. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907);
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, lnc, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 345, 244 N.E.2d 250,
254, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 776 (1969).
146. Estate of Hemingway, 23 N.Y.2d at 345, 244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d
at 776 (1969). Upon dissemination, the protection ceased. Id. Federal copyright protection did not arise until specific formalities, including registration, were completed.
See, e.g., Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 361, Pub. L. No. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652 (repealed
October 19, 1976) § 13 (copyright secured only after publication with notice of
copyright). Under the current statute, although the copyright in a work subsists from
creation onward, in order to obtain relief, certain formalities must still be complied
with. These formalities include placement of the copyright notice on the work, 17

U.S.C. § 401, depositing a copy for registration, 17 U.S.C. § 408, and formal registration prior to suit, 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412.
'147. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a) states, in part: "copyright in a work created
on or

after January 1, 1978 subsists from its creation .... "
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tion is contained within the list of exclusive rights bestowed upon
the copyright owner, all of the listed rights are placed, by the wording
of the statute, equally subject to the fair use doctrine.'" If fair use
applies equally to published and unpublished works, then stage of
publication does not belong in the analysis at all.'" 9
Reliance upon a facial reading of the statute does not end the
inquiry, however. The Court supported its affirmation of the right
of first publication by citing explicit congressional declarations that
the fair use provisions served only to codify the developed judicial
doctrine' and that fair use was to be less applicable to unpublished
works as compared to published ones.' '
Other arguments have been presented for applying the prepublication. One such argument centers on one of the principal theories for
the justification of fair use, the implied consent to use theory. The
consent theory states that by virtue of either the subject matter (scientific or technical, for example) or the manner of presentation (such
as a formbook), subsequent authors could expect that the first publisher
would consent to a reasonable use of the copyrighted material.' 2 In
other words, authors of copyrighted works would be expected to permit a limited us of their published works by authors to follow in
order that progress in the development of the particular subject matter
might continue with a minimum of interference. However, when a
work is in the prepublication stage, consent becomes difficult or im-

148. See supra note 3. Some support for this position can be found in the record
of the statute's passage. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at,57, which states that
"[E]verything in section 106 is made 'subject to section 107
in conjunction with [that provision]. ....

. . .'and

must be read

149. Brief for Respondents-at 32-5.
150. "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." SENATE REPORT, supra note 31,
at 62.
151. "The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly
limited since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice
on the part of the copyright owner." SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 64. The
dissent criticized the majority's reliance on that language, as it was used in the context of copying for classroom purposes. 105 S.Ct. at 2249 n.19. The dissent ignored, however, the statement in the Senate Report that the discussion of classroom
use was merely exemplary and did not signify treatment separate from other fair
use situations. SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 62.
152. See, e.g., Towle v. Ross, 321 F. Supp. 125, 127 n.4. (D. Oregon 1940).
If the consent theory is not available, the analysis of the primary factors is affected.
For example, a greater showing would have to be made that the amount and substantiality values and the potential competitive effect was low.
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possible to imply since the author or copyright holder has yet to af"
firmatively indicate the release of the work to the public.
One commentator recently has even suggested that the right of
first publication be absolute, in spite of the statute's language.'" Since
the prepublication stage is a particularly sensitive period in the evolution of a work, in order to insure that the incentive to produce and
publish will be undiminished, the rights of the copyright owner must
be reinforced during this period.'"
Recognition of the editorial interest of the copyright owner is also
6
served by preserving the right of first publication." This editorial
interest involves the accomodation of the copyright owner's desire
to be able to prevent release of the work before completion or revision to his liking.'" As it was noted by the Court, the editorial interest was important to Harper & Row, and was clearly demonstrated
by the confidentiality agreement with Ford.'"
Based on the demonstrated legislative intent and the various rationales for guarding the copyright owner's right of first publication,
the presumption raised by the Court can be seen to be a reasonable
accomodation between the competing interests of the copyright owner
and those who would use his work.' 59
153. Emasculating the Fair Use Accomodation of Competing Copyright and First
Amendment Interests, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 587, 616 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Fair
Use Accomodation].
154. Note: The Stage of Publication as a Fair Use Factor: Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 58 ST. Jon's L. REv 597, 607-10 (1984).
Since the commercial success of a work is most susceptible to damage by copying
during the prepublication stage, if the protected material is prematurely released,
a publisher or licensee may decide against publishing at all. Id. at 607.
155. Id.
156. Fair Use Accomodation, supra note 153, at 617.
157. Id.
158. 105 S. Ct. 2233. The dissent's categorization of the editorial interest as
being only an "economic interest in capturing the full 'value of release of information to the public," id. at 2250, does not purport to diminish the significance of
that interest, but merely questions its use in the nature of the copyrighted work factor.
By stating that the economic interest in confidentiality, part of the editorial interest,
belongs properly in the analysis of the competitive effect factor, the dissent takes
a step backward from its previously stated position that stage of publication formed
no part of the fair use determination at all. If the prepublication economic interest
is recognized as a sub-factor of any of the main factors, its presence will be felt.
Furthermore, the categorization ignores the possibility that a copyright owner might
have a genuine interest other than economic, in preventing prepublication release.
This would be so particularly in cases of fictional works, where the economic value
lies solely in the author's expression and the factual content is low or not present.
159. One extraordinary circumstance where a prepublication use would be permitted would be to prevent usage of copyright protection to suppress completely
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3. The Rejection of an Overriding Public Interest Factor-The
First Amendment Problem

Perhaps the most significant factor involved in the Supreme

Court's decision in Harper& Row was the factor the majority refused
to apply. The Court stated that there existed no specific overriding
first amendment considerations in the fair use analysis, and refused
to carve out an exception to the fair use doctrine whereby the works
of a public figure could be more readily used than those of a private
citizen. 160
The issue of the potential conflict between the first amendment
and certain aspects of copyright is a relatively recent development
of copyright law, having arisen only in the last two decades.' 6 ' The
Second Circuit in Rosemont Enterprisesv. Random House, Inc. stated
that the "public interest in free dissemination of information" required a finding of fair use in certain potentially socially useful
works, 6 especially those by or concerning a public figure. 63
While the Supreme Court, before Harper & Row, had not
expressly addressed the issue of first amendment interaction with federal
statutory copyright provisions with regard to public figures in particular, the holdings of the Court in certain non-copyright cases agree

with the Second Circuit's statements in Rosemont.'" In the copyright

publicly undisclosed information. Fair Use Accomodation supra note 153 at 617,
citing Rosemont Enters v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). See
note 130 supra and accompanying text.
160. 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2228-31 (1985).
161. One of the first attacks upon the distinction between fact and expression
by commentators suggested that in the realm of graphic arts, certain forms like news
photographs ought to be accorded little or no copyright protection. See NIMMER,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech and Press?
17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1197-1200 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer on First
Amendment]. In a work having no verbal content, separation of protectable expression
from unprotectable information content approaches impossibility; Nimmer offers the
example of a photograph, in which the subject matter is the informational content,
and the method used to present that subject matter (timing of the photo, shutter
speed, film type) comprises the expression. However, unlike a written passage, a
photo cannot be subdivided.
162. 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. den. 385 U.S. 1009 (1966) (billionaire
Howard Hughes, through a dummy corporation, purchased the copyrights to a series
of biographical magazine articles in an effort to prevent the release of an unauthorized
biography).
163. Id. at 309. Similar sentiments were expressed in the District Court of New
York, in determining that frames from a film taken at the time of the assassination
of President Kennedy were particularly subject to fair use. Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
164. Those cases recognizing the public's right to know as an outgrowth of the
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area, the Supreme Court has made only limited statements regarding
the applicability of any overriding first amendment considerations in
the fair use scheme.' 65 While the Supreme Court has not been active,
the federal courts since Rosemont have not been hesitant in using

public interest factors in their weighing processes.',
The debate' 7 concerning the inclusion of first amendment concepts into the fair use question has revealed two opposing positions.
The pro-copyright position, espoused by Professor Nimmer, among

others, is that there exists sufficient public interest protection in the

distinctions between ideas and expressions found in those sections of

the statute which determine what works are copyrightable,' 68 so as
to make public interest inroads into fair use both unnecessary and
undesirable. 6 9 The opposing view is that because the first amendment is to be construed as superseding the copyright provisions in
the Constitution,' 70 its impact suffuses through every congressional
enactment pursuant to the Constitution, including the fair use provisions.' It is the former position that the Court has taken in Harper
& Row." '2
first amendment, see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1971), and those
particularly widening access to discourse by or concerning public officials, see e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964), would have seemed
amenable to application in the copyright field.
165. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (where public's interest in wider distribution of copyrighted television programs was recognized as having a limited bearing on whether unauthorized videotaping made possible by defendant's equipment could be a fair use of the program).
166. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977) (dissemination of news serves public interest, but appropriation
of method of presenting news does not); A. A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980) (public interest in discourse of significant
historical events necessitates broadening of scope of fair use in regard to "historical
subject matter, including theories or plots"); Pacific and Southern Co., Inc. v.
Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984).

167. See Nimmer on First Amendment at 1200-04; Rosenfield, The Constitu-

tional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE

DAME

LAW. 790 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as Rosenfield]; Walker, Fair Use: The Adjustable Tool for Main-

taining Copyright Equilibrium, 43 LA. L. REv. 735, 754 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Walker]; Note, Harper & Row Publishers, v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating
the Fair Use Accomodation of Competing Copyright and First Amendment Interests,
79 Nw. U.L. REv. 587 (1984) (the last two articles concern themselves with The
Nation case through the trial and appellate court levels).
168. See supra note 16.
169. Nimmer on First Amendment at 1200-04.
170. See Rosenfield at 794-95. See supra note 1.
171. Id.
172. The Court's position on this issue is a strong one indeed. While actually
only holding that no public figure exception to copyright exists, the Court's state-
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It is of some concern that the Court, in refusing to incorporate
a public interest or public figure factor into the fair use determination, did so in opposition of such applications in the lower courts' 4
and against indications from its own analogous earlier holdings.'1
However, it is of equal or greater concern that the majority opinion
is internally inconsistent in rejecting the factor.' 7' The Court readily
employed factors previously external to the fair use scheme, bad faith
and stage of publication, to overwhelm the more traditional elements
found in purpose of use and nature of the protected work factors
(which arguably otherwise could have swung in favor of The Nation)
in order to assure a weighting of those factors against the
respondents.' 76 Use of a significant public interest factor, which could
have been incorporated into the purpose factor,' 7 7 for example, would
have militated towards a fair use finding, perhaps conclusively. Viewed
in light of these considerations, the exclusion of the public figure factor
seems arbitrary.'"7
V.

IMPLICATIONS

Taken in combination, the adjustments made by the Court in
the fair use analysis are likely to have considerable negative impact
upon the news media, and in turn upon the general public.
It is axiomatic that one of the main motivating factors behind
the reporting of the news is the opportunity to be the first to report
a given event to the general public. This motivation has the obvious
commercial aspect that whomever gets the news first sells the most.
There is also a certain satisfaction to be gained from being the first
to report that is independent of financial concerns. The race to the
presses is likely to be most fevered when the subject matter involves
persons or events that hold broad or significant public interest. The
Court's combined reliance upon bad faith and stage of publication,
ment that such an exception was antithetical to the copyright scheme and that works
of great importance deserved at least equal treatment with lesser works, see supra
note 98, argues against any generalized public interest fair use factor.
173. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 166, 167 and accompanying text.
175. A discussion of the validity of the opposing arguments and the Court's
propriety in its selection, aside from the consistency problems touched on here, would
be time-consuming and not on point.
176. See supra, generally, text accompanying notes 120-61.
177. See supra note 49.
178. Or worse yet, calculated. Given the peculiar fact pattern of the case, the
majority's opinion represents not so much a statement of the Court's views on the
fair use doctrine as it does a lesson on journalistic values and ethics. See Justice
Brennan's dissent, Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2248.
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and failure to consider public interest, penalized The Nation for responding to this motivation.
Future news editors will be hesitant to report the words of those
in the public eye; even the briefest quotations, if concerning particularly
significant subject matter, might be considered a substantial taking
by a court zealously following the Supreme Court's lead. Reporters
will feel forced either to avoid extensive quotation or resort to
exhaustive paraphrasing, or to wait until the public release. The first
alternative will dilute the quality of the news received by the public
as the media are forced to move further away from the particular
language used; the second alternative creates a virtual monopoly for
the copyright owner until he chooses to speak publicly. The pace of
free-flowing public debate will be slowed. The healthy competition
between members of the media will be disrupted as well. Those who
can afford to will purchase the publication rights to newsworthy
material about which they wish to report. The less wealthy or more
scrupulous will either have to take their chances with the courts or
go without the copyrighted material.
The effects of Harper & Row could spread into other
copyrightable forms of expression as well. For example, a copyright
owner might be in a position now to use the copyright as a device
to artifically enhance the value of his work by purchasing favorable
reviews in exchange for exclusive rights to prepublication excerpts.
The difficulty of proving allegations of such "payola" arrangements
could justify the risk.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court's view indicates that the interests of the copyright
holder and proper acknowledgement of the author's work and effort
are still vital concerns to be protected by the courts. In finding that
the use by a news commentary magazine was not excused as a fair
use, the Court has established a strong pro-copyright position in regard
to works used in bad faith, especially if used prior to first publication by the copyright owner. The Court's unwillingness to adopt a
broad first amendment-based public interest factor in addition to the
statutory list of factors further establishes the pro-copyight position.
Unfortunately, however justified the changes made by the Court may
be in terms of traditional copyright law, the Court's use of bad faith
and denial of a public interest factor have created a dangerous potential
for interference with free public debate and misuse of copyright
privileges at the hands of copyright owners.
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